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Abstract
The Stanley Miller experiment suggests that amino acid-based life
is ubiquitous in our universe, although its varieties are not likely to
have followed the particular, highly contingent and path-dependent,
trajectory found on Earth. Are many of those life forms likely to be
conscious in ways we would recognize? Almost certainly. Will many
conscious entities develop high order technology? Less likely. If so,
will we be able to communicate with them? Only on a basic level, and
only with profound difficulty. The argument is straightforward.
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1 Introduction
In spite of a social construction as such (e.g., Penrose, 1994), conscious-
ness is no great mystery, constituting a basic evolutionary adaptation that
has been with us for the better part of a half-billion years (R.G. Wal-
lace and R. Wallace, 2009, and references therein). Bernard Baars’ global
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workspace/global broadcast model – the current front-runner in the Dar-
winian competition between consciousness theories (e.g., Dehaene and Nac-
cache, 2001) – is nearly a generation old and accounts neatly, in a qualitative
manner, for consciousness-as-we-know-it on Earth (Baars, 1988, 2005):
1. The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed specialized
networks (processors).
2. Consciousness is associated with a global workspace in the brain – a
fleeting memory capacity whose focal contents are widely distributed (broad-
cast) to many unconscious specialized networks.
3. Conversely, a global workspace can also serve to integrate many com-
peting and cooperating input networks.
4. Some unconscious networks, called contexts, shape conscious contents,
for example unconscious parietal maps modulate visual feature cells that
underlie the perception of color in the ventral stream.
5. Such contexts work together jointly to constrain conscious events.
6. Motives and emotions can be viewed as goal contexts.
7. Executive functions work as hierarchies of goal contexts.
Although this basic approach has been the focus of work by many re-
searchers for two decades, consciousness studies has only recently, in the
context of a deluge of empirical results from brain imaging experiments, be-
gun digesting the perspective and preparing to move on.
The first essential point in developing a quantitative theory of conscious-
ness is to recognize Dretske’s central argument (Dretske, 1994) that high level
mental process of any nature inevitably involves the generation and trans-
mission of information, both of which are constrained by the asymptotic
limit theorems of information theory: Shannon Coding, Shannon-McMillan
Source Coding, and the Rate Distortion theorems (Khinchin, 1957; Cover
and Thomas, 2006).
The second fundamental point is to realize that, in the sense of Feynman
(2000) and Bennett (1988), information is simply another form of free energy,
and arguments-by-abduction from statistical physics are not unreasonable.
Indeed, it is not at all difficult to construct a simple (ideal) machine that
turns the information contained in a message into work.
Third, cognitive process, in the sense of Atlan and Cohen (1996), involves
comparison of a perceived signal with an internal picture of the world, and
then, on that comparison, choice of a response from a large repertoire of those
possible, hence causing a reduction in a formal measure of uncertainty. It is
then easy to show (Wallace, 2000; Wallace and Wallace, 2008, 2009) that a
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substantial class of such cognitive phenomena is necessarily associated with
an information source. Further, if there are N(n) possible behavioral and
hence temporal output paths of that information source having length n,
then there will be a path-independent limit H such that
H = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
.
(1)
This is the Shannon uncertainty of the (stationary, ergodic) information
source dual to the cognitive process.
We envision the evolution of a broad set of unconscious cognitive modules
within a reproducing organism that serve a number of independent purposes,
ranging from the search for food and habitat, and the avoidance of predation,
to modalities of reproduction. Thus, in even a simple organism, one has a
large network of unconscious cognitive modules that, necessarily, interact
through some kind of crosstalk, indexed by an average measure P .
2 Cognitive Phase Transitions
Recall that the free energy density of a physical system is defined as
F = lim
V→∞
−T log[Z[T, V ]]
V
≡ log[Zˆ[T, V ]]
V
,
(2)
where Z is the partition function of the Hamiltonian of a physical system
3
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
10
.5
28
6.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
18
 N
ov
 2
01
0
Z =
∑
i
exp[
−Ei(V )
κT
].
(3)
Ei(V ) is the energy of state i at system volume V , T the temperature,
and κ a constant.
Recall, now, Landau’s perspective on phase transition (Pettini, 2007).
The essence of his insight was that certain phase transitions took place in
the context of a significant symmetry change, with one phase being more
symmetric than the other. A symmetry is lost in the transition, i. e., spon-
taneous symmetry breaking. The greatest possible set of symmetries being
that of the Hamiltonian describing the energy states. Usually, states ac-
cessible at lower temperatures will lack the symmetries available at higher
temperatures, so that the lower temperature state is less symmetric.
Larger scale information sources can emerge from the crosstalk-enabled
interaction of underlying unconscious cognitive biological modules. Again,
index the average strength of crosstalk by an appropriate parameter P . Then
equation (1), representing the source uncertainty of this larger information
source, written as H, becomes
H[P ] = lim
n→∞
log[N(n, P )]
n
,
(4)
similar to the second part of equation (2), and we can apply Landau’s argu-
ment, assigning P as a temperature-analog.
Some evolved neural substructures of organisms may be expected to op-
erate at relatively high speed, in the realm of milliseconds. This implies,
in turn, the inevitable and highly punctuated emergence of a rapid global
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cognitive process from the interaction of unconscious cognitive submodules
if P becomes large enough.
Evolution can then take this emergent phenomenon and run with it.
Given a network of interacting unconscious cognitive modules, we can
construct an interacting network of dual information sources, and define a
metric, say r, on it, using the methods of Wallace (2005). On that network
it is then possible to define renormalization symmetries in terms of the usual
‘clumping’ transformation, so that, for clumps of size R, in an external ‘field’
of strength J (that we can set to 0 in the limit), one can write, in the usual
manner (e.g., Wilson, 1971)
H[P (R), J(R)] = f(R)H[P (1), J(1)],
χ(P (R), J(R)) = χ(P (1), J(1))/R,
(5)
where χ is a characteristic correlation length on the underlying network of
interacting dual information sources.
As Wallace (2005) shows, following Wilson (1971), very many ‘biological’
renormalizations, f(R), are possible that lead to a number of quite different
classes of phase transformation. Baars’ shifting global workspace emerges, in
this model, through the tuning of the renormalization symmetries (Wallace,
2005). In particular, Pettini’s (2007) topological argument can be used to
create topologically-defined thresholds for detection of sensory signals by the
shifting global information source representing consciousness (Wallace and
Fullilove, 2008, Section 3.7; Wallace, 2007).
Nothing in this set of realizations of the Baars model seems restricted
to terrestrial biological entities. Indeed, even on Earth, we know of widely
different brain structures that instantiate conscious behaviors, ranging from
familiar mammalian and avian forms, to reptiles, cephalopods, and perhaps
insect colonies (Griffin and Speck, 2004; Edelman et al., 2005; Cartmill,
2000).
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The essential point, from an astrobiological perspective, is that any or-
ganism that evolves a set of unconscious cognitive submodules is likely to
undergo an evolutionary transformation into something having a shifting,
tunable, global workspace/broadcast mechanism. Those operating in the
realm of a few hundred milliseconds would be analogous to consciousness-as-
we-know-it.
3 Quantum Systems
The theory above is quite classical, and produces Baars’ results directly.
Wallace (2005, Chapter 5, Section 6), however, does examine how quan-
tum versions of the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory (e.g.,
Bjelakovic et al., 2003, 2004) might be used to generalize the model. Un-
fortunately, the quantum results are not well characterized, and an exact
treatment is lacking, Nonetheless, it becomes quite clear that consciousness
in quantum systems – at least those supporting relatively large coherence
lengths – will be to consciousness-as-we-know-it much as a flask of superfluid
helium is to a glass of water.
Tegmark (2000), of course, has convincingly shown the impossibility of
quantum treatments of consciousness at normal biological temperatures.
Since information is a form of free energy, even quantum systems having
large coherence lengths will suffer second law heating through information
transmission and transformation that will inherently limit the possible size of
quantum-conscious structures. Typically 109 − 1010 interacting components
are needed for high level mental function, involving large-scale information
transfer. This scale of activity is likely to generate much heat, and unlikely to
be attained in quantum realms by evolutionary process in the natural world.
The inference is, then, that conscious quantum systems are likely to re-
main in the realm of perpetual motion machines of the second kind.
4 Culture, Technology, and Institutional Dis-
tributed Cognition
The evolutionary anthropologist Robert Boyd has asserted that ‘Culture is as
much a part of human biology as the enamel in our teeth,’ (e.g., Richerson and
Boyd, 2004) and, while many other animals on Earth display some measure
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of culture as learned and transmitted behavior (e.g., Avital and Jablonka,
2000), nothing defines humans quite like the interpenetration of mind and
self with cultural milieu. Technology and its artifacts are, of course, one part
of that milieu.
It is not difficult to extend the Baars model to include interaction with an
embedding culture seen as a generalized language associated with an infor-
mation source, both as a form of niche construction (Wallace, 2010), and in
terms of cognitive institutional structures acting on various scales (Wallace
and Fullilove, 2008).
As the anthropologists will attest, an astounding variety of culturally-
driven institutions, associated forms of mind and self, and dynamics of inter-
action, graces the world. Typically, humans, whose overall genetic structure
is more uniform than that of chimpanzee populations, do not communicate
well across the many different cultural modes. The results of Wallace and
Fullilove (2008) suggest that stabilizing complex systems of interacting cog-
nitive institutions is exceedingly difficult, given that canonical inability to
communicate, and the planet seems to be facing a serious crisis of sustain-
ability.
5 Consciousness in Astrobiology
Certain matters seem clear from this line of argument:
Life in the cosmos is likely to be ubiquitous. Organisms that must react
on timescales of a few hundred milliseconds should host many ‘neural-like’
structures that, in the presence of sufficient crosstalk, provide evolutionary
process with the basic material to produce adaptive tunable/shifting global
workspace/broadcast phenomena that become fixed in reproduction and that
we would likely recognize as conscious.
Some (very) few of these organisms will, over sufficient time, become
synergistic with learned, transmissible, language-like patterns of adaptation
analogous to culture. Assuming even fewer of these creatures are able to
stabilize the resulting systems of distributed cognition, development of a
significant level of technology seems likely, although communication with
them would probably be limited to exchanges of Balmer series symbols and
schematics for amino acids. Astrobiology seems possible. Astroethology is a
daunting dream.
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